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Editorial

A MONTH or two will elapse before we shall be able to comment on the Report of the Lambeth Conference. Meanwhile, we will make some remarks on the report of the *Conversations between the Church of England and the Methodist Church: an interim statement.*[1] Despite their proximity in most parts of England Anglicans and Methodists are woefully ignorant about one another, and the chapters in this report which explain how the breach between Methodism and the Church of England came about, and what the special marks of Methodism are, are to be applauded for their informative character. On the Anglican side a statement is provided which deals more fully and constructively than usual with the case for episcopacy and the grounds on which it is to be commended. Prior to this, there is a succinct but definite account of what the two Churches have in common as things are, and if this is compared with the lack of positive Christian belief by which they are surrounded it will seem to afford a strong *prima facie* motive and basis for union. The representatives of both Churches say that they are agreed that "nothing short of organic unity, whatever form it may take, should be our final goal".

When they come to discuss practical steps that might be taken their proposals are, however, "interim" in a twofold sense. They are concerned only with a stage of growth towards unity which would fall short of organic unity, and as regards this they have propounded suggestions which they want to see studied and discussed before they proceed to prepare a further statement or a final report.

Their provisional proposals hinge principally upon the question how and under what conditions the Methodist Church might take episcopacy into its system, and of the two methods they consider they are no doubt right in preferring the more thoroughgoing. They are contemplating a state of affairs in which the two Churches would be "parallel entities, each with its own characteristics and forms of worship, with their representatives regularly meeting together in a general assembly, the ministries and sacraments of each part being acceptable and available to the other". The presupposition of this proposal is that "our Churches cannot at once be merged in a single homogeneous Church". No one of course supposes that this can happen "at once". The great question is whether that is what we should be aiming at directly or only as an eventual goal.

It is a grave shortcoming of this approach that it entails an abandonment, or at least a side-tracking, of what Bishop Newbigin in our

[1] S.P.C.K. and Epworth Press, 3s. 6d.

June number described as "the great truth . . . to which Anglicanism has borne witness, namely the indissoluble relation between sacramental fellowship and the total life of the Church". As he said, "Faithfulness to the revealed will of God requires of us that we should be content with nothing less than this: that all who accept Christ as Lord and Saviour should be recognizably one family *in each place*". "It is at the level or ordinary congregational life that church union becomes real, and at the same time costly." We hope that the representatives of the Churches, when they resume their deliberations, will give their minds to the implications of this truth. How can the Christian congregations which are at present existing separately in the towns and villages of England become recognizably one family? This must involve much more than parallelism at the start. We miss any close study of the diverse patterns of church life at the local level, and of what would be the obstacles to bringing them into unity, and of what would be the likely benefits of doing so. In short, we are not at all enamoured of the idea of parallelism as an intermediate state of indeterminate duration.

If parallelism is the most that Christians in England can be expected to move forward to in this age of the world, our plight is appalling. If a bolder and more costly course could be displayed to the Churches, the response might be surprising. Anyhow, we recommend those who read the Anglican-Methodist report to read again Bishop Newbigin's article, and to mark their incompatibility.

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Calvin's commentaries on the Bible are not only of great interest to the historian of theology but are also worthy to be consulted by the contemporary expositor. The latest volume in the "Library of Christian Classics"—*Calvin: Commentaries*, newly translated and edited by Dr Joseph Haroutunian[1]—contains selections from the commentaries under the following headings: The Bible, The Knowledge of God, Jesus Christ, The Christian Life, Faith, Providence, Election and Predestination, Ethics and the Common Life, and The Church. There is also an illuminating introduction, together with other prefatory material. This volume will enable the reader both to improve his understanding of what Calvin actually taught and also to prove the value of referring to his exposition of particular passages. The full text of the commentaries is most conveniently available in the edition of the Calvin Translation Society.

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It is part of the traditional teaching of the Roman Catholic Church that unbaptized infants go to limbo, a state of perpetual exclusion from the beatific vision, and Pope Pius XII appeared recently to have reiterated it. An article by Père L. Renwart, S.J., on "Le baptême des enfants et les limbes" in the May 1958 issue of *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* shows that there is a number of Roman Catholic theo-

[1] S.C.M. Press, 35s.

logians who are dissatisfied with the traditional teaching and who are exploring ways of so reinterpreting it as to admit the belief that unbaptized infants can attain to eternal beatitude.

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Two newly published books will be of service to those who are starting to study the Greek of the New Testament. Dr Eric Jay's *New Testament Greek*[1] is a grammar expressly intended for beginners, not least for any who come to the language some years after they have left school or the university. On the other hand, it is not merely elementary but will in the end carry the student a long way. *The Interlinear Greek-English New Testament*[2] will also be useful to beginners. It is edited by Dr Alfred Marshall, who has provided a literal translation of the Greek text; in the margin the text of the A.V. is printed as well.

The Beginnings of the Gospel Tradition

Prof. Harald Riesenfeld's address at the opening session of the Congress on "The Four Gospels in 1957" held at Oxford last September, which has been published as a substantial pamphlet entitled *The Gospel Tradition and its Beginnings*,[3] merits careful attention, for the author not only questions the whole reconstruction of the origins of the Gospel tradition which is associated with form-criticism (the sub-title of the address is "A Study in the Limits of 'Formgeschichte' "), but also puts forward an alternative hypothesis to account for that tradition.

Form-criticism has not had a good reception in this country. Bultmann's *Die Geschichte der Synoptischen Tradition* remains untranslated (why do we so often translate the wrong German books and leave the more important untranslated?), while Dibelius was so ill served by the translator of his *Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums* that it is sometimes necessary to retranslate into German to see what he intends to say. Moreover, form-criticism has provided yet one more instance of a method being pushed remorselessly, dogmatically, *more Germanico*, to such extremes as to be almost discredited in the process. Many will have found themselves muttering "nonsense!" when Dibelius postulates the existence in the early church of a class of tale-tellers, whose function it was to narrate miracle stories, and will have experienced the greatest difficulty in imagining, and believing in, those "community debates" which figure so largely in Bultmann's pages. No method more than this one should have required very delicate handling, a large dash of agnosticism, a refusal to

[1] S.P.C.K., 21s.
[2] Samuel Bagster and Sons, 42s.
[3] Mowbray, 2s. 6d.

be doctrinaire and a willingness to be content with tentative suggestions. Thus Prof. Riesenfeld makes a valid point when he contends that, judged by the motifs which they contain, the miracle stories, so far from being the products of a hellenistic milieu, as both Bultmann and Dibelius maintain, can be seen to rest upon a genuine Old Testament and Jewish basis (a class in Oxford came recently to the same conclusion in its study of these stories, though with perhaps more allowance for the hellenistic milieu). But this is only to question some findings of some form-critics by the use of their own methods. The basic pre-supposition of form-criticism is that the life, needs and interests of the primitive church lie behind the formation of the Gospel tradition, and in some measure determine its selection and shaping. This Riesenfeld emphatically denies. Can the kerygma as we have it summarized, for example, in Acts 2, 10 and 13 be regarded as an epitome of which the Gospel tradition is, as it were, an expansion? This he dismisses as a hypothetical dogma and myth. "Data are wholly wanting to support such a process of expansion, and there is certainly nothing in our Gospels, especially if we compare the Synoptics with the Fourth Gospel, which gives the slightest basis for such a hypothesis." Is this not in its turn too sweeping and dogmatic? Data, internal or external, which would be conclusive are wanting for any hypothesis of Gospel origins. If it were not so there would be no debate. We are often reduced through lack of data to guess work and to reading between the lines. Of the kerygma in Acts more than one thing can be said. It may represent a genuine summary of apostolic preaching; if so, it cannot be ruled out as impossible that the particular emphases of the kerygma led to the emergence of the passion narrative and of miracle stories as ancillary to what the kerygma proclaimed, i.e., to use Riesenfeld's own words, "the saving work of Christ". Or it may be to a greater extent the creation of Luke himself, in which case it may have been a fitting summary for him of the content of his first volume, and may be evidence, so far as it goes, that for him the kerygma and the Gospel tradition were not disconnected. Can catechetical instruction and edification of Christian communities be allowed as a possible *sitz im leben* (setting in life) of parts of the tradition? This also Riesenfeld denies. If it were so, he argues, then it would be inexplicable that, while we have countless allusions to the sayings of Jesus in the Epistles, we have no express citations of his words. This strange fact, he says, can only be explained if the writers of the Epistles were at pains to avoid express citations of the sayings of Jesus in their original context; the sayings of Jesus, and hence the tradition about Jesus, were presumed to be already known, but this tradition was not cited in its verbal form. This lack of quotation of the words of Jesus is, indeed, a strange fact, from which any account of Gospel origins must to some extent take its start, but in his estimate of it Riesenfeld leans very heavily on the supposition that numerous passages in the Epistles are direct recollections of the teaching of Jesus. But this is only a supposition, not conclusive data, and it is disputable. Thus, is it certain that the words in that rather enigmatic Epistle of

James (about which more than one view is possible), "Hearken my beloved brethren. Did not God choose them that are poor in the world to be rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom?" are dependent upon the two beatitudes of Matt. 5. 3, 5 in combination, or do both passages reflect a Jewish piety of which we have other examples? Is the saying in Jas. 1. 25 rightly said to have "its counterpart" in John 13. 17? Are we justified in isolating the words in Rom. 12. 14, "Bless them that persecute you, bless and curse not", from the long list of typically Pauline exhortations, derived from Paul's doctrine of the Church as the body of Christ, in which they occur, and in describing them as "simply a paraphrase of the saying of Jesus, 'Love your enemies and pray for your persecutors' (Matt. 5. 44)"? At one point the argument comes near to having it both ways, since, while it is asserted that the teaching of Jesus was never cited in its verbal form, it is also asserted that the author of the Epistle of James so presupposes parts of the Sermon on the Mount as known to his readers that "we can establish the verbal form of the sayings of Jesus which James presupposes as that of Matthew and not of Luke".

Having reached the negative conclusion that neither preaching nor instruction supplied the matrix of the Gospel tradition, Riesenfeld advances to his positive thesis. This may be summarized as follows. There was already existing in Judaism a well-established process for the transmission of oral tradition. We can see its results in the "Sayings of the Fathers", which found their literary embodiment in the Mishnah. The technical terms associated with it appear in the New Testament behind the Greek words *παράδοσις* (tradition), *παραλαμβάνειν* (take over), and *παραδιδόναι* (hand over). This transmission was no casual event; it was rigidly controlled, in as much as what was being transmitted was holy. The bearer of the tradition, the rabbi, watched over its memorizing by approved pupils. Paul in 1 Thess. 4. 1 refers to himself as having given his readers traditions of how they ought to conduct themselves. "Examination of the use of similar expressions elsewhere in Paul justifies us in assuming that they were words of Jesus about the nature of discipleship and the mode of life to be followed by the brethren." When Paul, after three years in Arabia, went up to Jerusalem to see Peter "it is reasonable to conclude that his chief concern in these weeks was not theological discussions or ecclesiastical projects but something which was the precondition of the fulfilment of his apostolic work, namely that Peter should test whether he, Paul, during his preparation, had really made the tradition of the words and deeds of Jesus his own, in the form, that is, which these words and deeds had assumed by that date". It was the possession of this tradition which distinguished an apostle; when the apostles are said in Acts 6. 2 to devote themselves to the service of the Word, what is meant is not primarily preaching but the guardianship of the tradition. This tradition, in accordance with the laws which governed it, will have been recited; it will have been recited as *λόγος*, *λόγος θεοῦ*, or *ῥῆμα*, which are technical terms in the New Testament for the tradition and not for the missionary preaching, which is designated by *Εὐαγγέλιον*, and which were also

terms used in Judaism for Holy Scripture. It will have been recited in Christian worship as a complement to, and fulfilment of, the sacred words of the Old Testament, and instruction upon it would follow. This is why the words and deeds of Jesus were never quoted in missionary preaching or community instruction—they were holy, esoteric and exclusive. "Mission preaching, indeed, pointed and led to it (i.e. tradition). The instruction in the community presupposed it and linked itself up with it. But in its verbal form and in its Sitz im Leben in the community it was sui generis." How did the tradition come to have this character? Because this process of transmission had its origin in Jesus himself. As rabbi he made his disciples learn by heart. Parts of his teaching, e.g. in the Sermon on the Mount, appear to have been carefully formulated so as to be apt for transmission. The idea of the Gospel tradition growing up freely in the course of the Church's preaching and teaching is a romantic picture. Jesus did not preach indiscriminately nor continually; he imposed certain limitations on his preaching as on his miracles. "We must think of the disciples in their relation to this message as sitting at Jesus' feet, partly in order to hear once again the words and to get to know them by heart, partly that they may be instructed in their meaning as e.g. (in the matter of method) in Mark 4. 11." Gradually, with the increase of the Church, the need for authorized transmitters of the tradition became greater, and this led in the end to the fixation of the tradition in writing.

Clearly no more than the outlines of a theory of Gospel origins can be sketched within the limits of a single lecture. A book, or several books, would be needed to substantiate the statements on which it rests. It may be said, however, of this theory, as the author himself says of the form-critical hypothesis, that data are wanting to support it, if by data we mean conclusive data. We have, that is, in the New Testament itself no actual description of Jesus making his disciples learn by heart a logos for future dissemination, nor of a Christian assembly in which a portion of the tradition is recited as holy tradition and as the basis for instruction. This theory, like any other, must be tested by whether it does more justice to what little we know, whether it enables us to read more profitably between the lines, and whether it provides a more adequate account of why the Gospel tradition is what it is. The theory is presented in two parts. In the first part it is the apostles who are the guardians and repositories of the tradition and who give it shape; in the second part it is Jesus who himself begins the process of giving shape to the tradition, and this is continued by the apostles. It would be possible to hold the first part without necessarily holding the second. The second part, taken by itself, can obviously be made to cover only a portion of the tradition. Jesus can hardly be held to be the originator of the narratives of the passion or of such incidents as the Baptism and Transfiguration, since he is here the subject and not the narrator of the events. It cannot cover the miracle stories, since he is the one who performs the miracles and not the one who describes their performance. Riesenfeld's reference to Mark 8. 19–21 and Matt. 11. 4 f. as instances

of comments by Jesus upon the significance of what he has performed would not carry us far, if any way at all, towards establishing Jesus as the originator of the miracle story tradition. The same would seem to be true of such teaching as is enclosed within what the form-critics call paradigms, apothegms or pronouncement stories, i.e. where it is given in reply to the question of a bystander or of opponents, or in the context of an incident in which Jesus is the principal figure. He can hardly have taught by telling stories about himself as a teacher. This leaves the teaching pure and simple. Does this originate in the delivery by Jesus to his disciples of what was to be learnt by heart as holy word? This is not impossible. It is true that the only reference to paradosis in the Gospels is the hostile one to the Jewish "tradition of the elders". Nevertheless, he who says "They of old time said . . . but I say unto you" was evidently not uttering casual remarks nor distributing instruction wholesale, but was placing his own authoritative pronouncements alongside, and above, a law which was held to be divine. The implications of this have, perhaps, been insufficiently weighed. What is implied by the application of the title "rabbi" to Jesus in the Gospels? Does it mean that he was in a general sense recognized as a teacher or, more than this, that he employed rabbinic methods? Riesenfeld warns us that the parallel with the rabbis should be pressed only in order to explain the form of the tradition, not its content. But how far can form and content be separated? The rabbinic method of transmission was governed by the necessity of securing a guaranteed succession of teachers and by the fact that what was being expounded was a sacred text and law. Jesus' teaching is not recorded as comment upon a text but as his own pronouncements with authority, whose source was in himself. Would the rabbinic method of tradition have suited this? Further, if we can trust the evangelists as to the audience—and the fact that the same piece of teaching can appear in different Gospels as delivered to different audiences would suggest that in this matter we cannot rely on them very much—it would seem that a great deal of the teaching was delivered to the crowds, and was not therefore learnt by heart, unless we are to suppose that it was repeated in private to the disciples. How far can we generalize from Mark 4. 10–12, a notoriously difficult passage which, if Jeremias is right, does not apply to parables in the first place at all? If the evidence suggests that allegorical interpretations of parables are a secondary product of the Church, are not Mark 4. 10–20 and Matt. 13. 36 ff. removed as possible supports of Riesenfeld's thesis? Does not the existence of some parables in two versions differing in both content and application, such as the Lost Sheep, the Wedding Feast and the Talents, argue against an early fixation of the tradition at its source, and argue for a freedom to develop and adapt, especially when the differences correspond closely with the differences in the milieu of each evangelist? Riesenfeld seeks to guard against these objections. "We are naturally not saying either that the Gospel tradition existed from the very first in its settled form as we find it in the Synoptic tradition, or that it can be traced back to Jesus in its definitive shape. It

is self-evident that the moulding of the tradition, e.g. by the collecting and grouping of individual pericopes, through its transformations and also through its additions, came about gradually in the life of the primitive Church. The essential point is that the outlines, that is the beginnings of the proper genus of the tradition of the words and deeds of Jesus, were memorized and recited as holy word." It is not easy to grasp precisely what is meant by "the beginnings of the proper genus of the tradition". If it means that Jesus impressed upon the disciples from the first that what they were listening to was to be treated as though it were Holy Scripture, then it becomes difficult to account for the considerable amount of variation even in e.g. the Lord's Prayer. The more the stress is laid upon memorizing and reciting as holy word, the more we should expect the resultant tradition to be something which looked as if it had been relatively fixed from the start, which is hardly what we do find in the Gospels. The more room there is left for transformation and adaptation the less need there is of the hypothesis of a rigid method of transmission.

The theory in its first part, viz. that the apostles were the bearers and reciters of the paradosis of the words and deeds of Jesus from the first, can be made to cover the whole of the Gospel material and not just the teaching. The existence of paradosis in the Church, what this implies, and what kind of tradition it was, are matters which certainly need to be taken more seriously and which require further investigation. As Riesenfeld justly observes, tradition is part of the *sitz im leben*, and to ignore it is to distort the picture. Nevertheless, it is not proven that the exhortations and commandments which Paul gave to the Thessalonians "in Christ" and "through Jesus Christ" consisted of words of Jesus about the conduct of disciples, while some will think that the supposition that the main purpose of Paul's visit to Jerusalem was to be tested by Peter as to the adequacy of his mastery of the tradition of the words and deeds of Jesus accords ill with Paul's own passionate avowal in Galatians of his independence of the apostles and of the independence of his own gospel which came by revelation. It may be noted that the two passages in which Paul employs the technical language of tradition, *παραλαμβάνειν* and *παραδιδόναι*, occur in precisely those contexts which Riesenfeld denies as the matrix of the tradition, missionary preaching and communal instruction. In the first, 1 Cor. 15. 1 ff., they are used to remind the Corinthians of what he had said when he first preached the Gospel at Corinth, and in the second, 1 Cor. 11. 23 ff., they are used to give effect to his instruction of the Corinthians on the proper observation of the Eucharist. Further, is it the case that *ῥῆμα*, *λόγος* and *λόγος θεοῦ* are New Testament terms for the Gospel tradition, corresponding to Jewish terms for Holy Scripture, and to be distinguished from *ἐναγγέλιον*, which stands for the missionary appeal of the Gospel? A considerable number of passages (e.g. Acts 4. 4; 6. 7; 8. 4, 14, 25; 10. 36; 13. 5, etc.; 1 Thess. 2. 13; 1 Cor. 1. 17 ff.; 2 Cor. 2. 12 ff.; Rom. 10. 8 ff.) would suggest that there was a close connexion between these words and *ἐναγγέλιον*. A crucial question is, however,

whether the evangelists, whose works are the end product of this process of transmission, show themselves by the manner in which they handle the tradition to be aware that what they are handling has been sacrosanct from the beginning as holy word. This again is a question not easy to answer, since we have no criterion for judging how far in such a case an evangelist would regard himself as free to abbreviate, omit or adapt, but it would not seem that the way in which Matthew and Luke use Mark is evidence of such an awareness. Inevitably in this connexion, as Riesenfeld observes, the problem of the Fourth Gospel is raised, since its author appears to handle the tradition with such remarkable freedom. The solution to which Riesenfeld is inclined, and to which he is perhaps driven by his own theory, is that the Fourth Gospel rests upon an independent line of tradition, running parallel with the Synoptic, having as its starting point discourses and meditations of Jesus in the circle of his disciples, which took place side by side with their instruction in more rigid forms, and itself subject to a long and complex development (cp. the similar view of W. F. Albright in *The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology*, ed. W. D. Davies and D. Daube). The great difficulties of this view are that such a tradition should have been, apparently, unknown to any of the three Synoptic writers, and that in its present form it is so close to the idiom of the Johannine Epistles that a development must be presupposed so long and so complex as to reduce the original kernel almost to vanishing point.

Finally, as Riesenfeld remarks, the problem of the origin of the Gospel tradition raises in the last resort the question of the messiahship of Jesus. Here Bultmann is at his weakest. In the first chapter of his *Theology of the New Testament*, by so scaling down the Gospel material until it leaves Jesus as an eschatological prophet, he leaves a vacuum which makes the subsequent development of belief in the early Church well nigh unintelligible. If Jesus, in some sense, contemplated himself as messiah and envisaged a messianic community he will, presumably, have acted and spoken in such a way as to prepare for a future. It does not, however, follow that, to quote Riesenfeld, Jesus "reckoned with what we may call the recital of the Gospel tradition between his death and the parousia". The questions still remain open, what kind of a messiah and what kind of a future? If as messiah he proclaimed the imminent breaking in of the kingdom, or the imminent vindication of a kingdom already present, is he likely to have prepared for it by rabbinic methods? Was the fervent expectation of the parousia in the early Church the outcome of the preaching of Jesus or a misunderstanding of it? If the former, is it likely that Jesus issued in advance a new law of the new covenant, or is this a later conception of the Church which is to be seen chiefly in St Matthew's Gospel? In two memorable essays in the symposium *Mysterium Christi*, Dr Dodd and Sir Edwyn Hoskyns gave us studies of Jesus as rabbi, prophet and messiah. What we now need is a study of the connexion between Jesus as rabbi, Jesus as prophet, Jesus as eschatological preacher and Jesus as messiah, especially in relation to the form and content of his message. Prof. Riesenfeld forces us to ask

such questions, and in asking them to realize how great are the gaps in our knowledge. I do not think that his thesis enables us to answer them.

C. F. Evans.

A 20th Century Folk Mass

Last December both the *Musical Times* and *Musical Opinion* found themselves having to review the Rev. Geoffrey Beaumont's setting "A Twentieth-Century Folk Mass"—largely because the television performance in October had brought it into the public eye. Their reviews were scathing and written with the asperity that only musicians can muster, but nevertheless they present a formidable case against the "Folk Mass", and will no doubt carry much weight with influential people in the sphere of church music. Besides the musical criterion which, one suspects, is the final court before which Fr Beaumont is condemned, we are treated to quite an amount of liturgics and theology in the process of "damning" the setting, and the writers of this article wholeheartedly believe that a case for or against the "Folk Mass" must rest ultimately on theological grounds.

We propose to describe two performances of the setting at the College of the Resurrection, Mirfield, and to draw out some tentative conclusions and suggestions.

Both these performances were in the College Chapel on the occasion of a Greater Saint's Day. For accompaniment a skiffle group was used, composed of college students, and consisting of piano, guitar, 'cello (in the absence of a double bass), and washboard. This group was able to produce the necessary rhythmic beat in order to give the setting "life", and yet did not in any way dominate, so that the words were always the primary thing. (One should not be too much put off by the wobbly, cinema-like background of Hammond organ in one of the records of the "Folk Mass" on the market—a skiffle group improves music of this kind beyond all recognition.) On the first occasion two cantors were used, but this was increased to four in the second in order to give a stronger lead. The only example of the "Propers" given is a setting of Psalm 150, and as this was not considered suitable for our purpose, the Propers were omitted, as was the setting of the "Our Father", chiefly because of the time factor. The latter is quite an important point, as much of the people's part consists of phrases repeated after the cantors. This could become tedious as well as lengthy, and we hope that a successor to the "Folk Mass" will avoid the necessity of repetition by a more "catchy" melody and less frequent changes of rhythm and key.

On each occasion we had four hymns, all in the same idiom. The first time we used the three hymns published by Fr Beaumont, and adapted one of the themes of the Mass for a short Gradual hymn. The second time we used two of Fr Beaumont's tunes, setting them to different words, and two others produced experimentally, one in

tango time and the other in a "medium shuffle" rhythm taken from the current trends in "rock 'n' roll". It is noticeable that the reviewers referred to do not mention Fr Beaumont's hymns. They are by far the most effective things he has produced, and it is not difficult to see why: for regular metres allow a much more successful adaptation of modern dance rhythms, whereas the Creed and Gloria pose especially difficult problems in this direction. Finally, the college found no difficulty in singing the entire setting with four hymns after a practice of only three-quarters of an hour. There was no special choir (beside the cantors) and a duplicated sheet of words served to indicate the occasional pitfalls where the people do *not* repeat what the cantors have sung.

The idea of our using the "Folk Mass" was simply to see if we could really worship in this style of music. One of the reviewers says: "A certain kind of popular music is inevitably associated with the fetid atmosphere of a night club, dance hall or cabaret, and its emphasis on cheap, moronic, sexual allurement. But the service of Holy Communion is, surely, something far removed from the idea of 'revelry by night'." Opinions in the college differed—a few people did not like it, and one person could not stand it, but generally people found themselves genuinely able to worship through this medium. Perhaps 7.15 a.m. is too early for the kind of associations which our reviewer suggests—but what is important is that both ministers and congregation felt no difficulty or incongruity in using this setting to the greater glory of God. It would be just too bad for some of our highbrow church musicians if besides finding that in heaven Welsh was God's language, the heavenly choir were found to have adopted a Beaumont type of music for their endless Alleluias! This is not to say that the writers of this article do not appreciate good church music and the great composers of all periods. But what we are here concerned about is the present-day division of sacred and secular, further accentuated in music by the cleavage between popular and classical. Some people seem to be able to accept the situation complacently. To quote *Musical Opinion*: "That Church music is utterly foreign to the majority of people is—alas!—only too true, but then so is the teaching of the Church and particularly the language in which the Church couches its liturgy. We still use the Elizabethan language of Archbishop Cramer (*sic*) in our forms of service, we still adhere to sixteenth-century English in the Psalter and in the Bible. It is somewhat pointless, therefore, to suggest that a Folk Mass needs only a new musical setting to make it familiar to the majority of people, when the very Language itself of the Mass is incomprehensible except to those brought up within the fold of the Church." If the situation is really as black as this, then someone ought to do something about it as soon as possible. In fact, quite a number of churches use modern translations of the Bible—R.S.V. or Phillips—and certainly the Anglican church is not tied to the A.V. just because of its beauty of language. We hope that sometime in the not too distant future there will be a successful revision of the Prayer Book, and that one result will be a liturgical language better able to be "under-

standed of the people". Surely the point of the Beaumont experiment was to try to find a *musical* idiom in which the majority of people would feel at home. Unfortunately, most of the experts in conventional church music seem to be in the corresponding minority.

What Fr Beaumont seems to mean by "Folk Mass" is the popular vocal music of the day—the type that the majority of people sing and hum to themselves. The words are usually very trite, but some tunes last a long time. Anyone who listens to "Housewives' Choice" or "Family Favourites" will know that it is not always the most up-to-date "hits" that are really popular. Particularly hard-wearing is the music of the 'thirties—of musical comedies such as "Show Boat". It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the music of the "Folk Mass" seems to be modelled in the style of the "ever-green" tunes of the 'thirties: for while it is obvious that if we *are* to have church music of this kind, it must be in an idiom which is still popular, there is no call to experiment with the most modern styles just because they *are* modern. This surely is the answer to those who object to the "Folk Mass" that it is not even up-to-date popular music. What is wanted is the type of hymn tune and setting of the Mass which people can go about humming and whistling—and who knows whether associations may be reversed? It is not all that long ago that a labourer might be heard singing a Wesley hymn or a Salvation Army tune about his work. The paper-boy may yet find himself whistling "O Lamb of God" or "Lord, thy word abideth" on his round. At any rate, this kind of thing happened in college. Of course such music as this will always be ephemeral to some degree—it will not have the durability of plainsong or of the great English Church composers from Tudor times onward. No one (probably not even Fr Beaumont) would wish the "Folk Mass" to have as long a life as "Merbecke". We look for more such settings, perhaps in a more modern idiom—certainly written with a surer hand—but they will always be essentially popular music. "Highbrow" jazz has no more hope than Palestrina of becoming part of the life of many churches in modern England.

But there are deeper issues involved. We believe that more harm than good was done by the doubtful allegations of Fr Beaumont and his supporters (e.g. in the information printed on the record dust-cover) that he is doing no more than Merbecke did. The musicians have been only too quick to score off this extremely questionable and quite unsubstantiated claim. Nor do we think that hopes that it may "bring the young folk in", though possibly true, are a sound basis for the use of popular-type music in worship. All this misses the essential point that worship is the dedication of the whole man to God, and that its outward expression must, if it is to be adequate, be symbolic of this truth. The fact of the Incarnation demonstrates that there is no part of man's nature which is not capable of being made—indeed, which has not been made through Christ—at one with God. The whole of man and his activities can, and must be, redeemed. While the redemption of many material things, such as atomic energy (to take an extreme example), obviously lies outside the scope of wor-

ship, the arts, as the expression of men's thoughts and aspirations, have a peculiarly and necessarily close connexion with it. And it is a monstrous thing to exclude the particular kind of art form which expresses the inner feelings of the vast majority of Western people—i.e. music of a strongly rhythmic and simple melodic type—just because this particular sub-division of art seems trite and banal to a few. The writers are only too ready to admit that quite a considerable proportion of the "Folk Mass" is not particularly good of its kind: but what seems to us totally unjustifiable is the dismissal of the whole category of popular music as incompatible with the worship of God. The reviewers are indeed to be applauded in looking for a new and better "Folk Mass": but it will be, we hope, a better specimen of the same kind.

Another fundamental objection which must be faced is that "only the best is good enough for God", and that "Beaumont" does not come within this category. We believe this to be the sincere background to the rather captious remarks of the reviewers, and also the view of many less "highbrow" church musicians. But fruitful as this principle may have been in the work of, e.g. the Royal School of Church Music, it cannot be considered solely from a musical, or even an aesthetic, point of view. Every parish priest knows this, and even bodies with such laudably high ideals as the R.S.C.M. recognize it in practice. One often *cannot* do what one may be quite sure is best. One may have to rest content with Stainer's "Crucifixion" instead of a Schütz Passion requiring no greater resources. One may have to put up with the sugariest hymn tunes in "Ancient and Modern" Unrevised because the organist can play no others. And if it is true, as we have argued, that no category of music as such can be condemned as unfit for the service of God, then it is justifiable to use the "Beaumont" setting, because there *is* no other of this vitally needed type. Our argument is that the best in such circumstances is the best which local resources and the availability of music permit, and that this is quite acceptable to God. One suspects that the real emotional objection of those who protest so great a respect for the solemnity of the Holy Communion, as do our reviewers, is the thought of "sacrilege". We do not think that such objections can be maintained when brought out into the open in face of the Incarnation. And so the fact remains that until someone writes something better in the same idiom, the answer to the modern dilemma will be Fr Beaumont's setting.

The writers do not consider that this will be suitable for every type of parish, but it may be found a great help in parishes like the East London one for which Fr Beaumont originally produced it.

The Church has just emerged from a period when she was particularly felt to be out of date in face of the advances of science. In England we have just woken up to changes necessary in the pastoral work and mission of the Church. This revolution in music may be a red herring, but let us not condemn it complacently without a period of thorough experiment. Our generation desperately needs to hear what the Church has got to tell it, but it cannot understand the

language she uses. Can we honestly blame a generation with such an upbringing as ours?

Finally, we must remember that, whether Fr Beaumont's speculations about Merbecke are true or not, this is not the first time that music of an essentially popular kind has been used for worship. The Church was not slow to learn the value of "catchy" tunes and words from that acute heresiarch, Arius. Luther carried through a Reformation with the aid of great popular hymns. And was it a member of the Salvation Army—or was it Ira D. Sankey—who said "Why should the devil have all the best tunes?"

C. A. Barber and B. Dawson.

A Christian in Philosophy: Maurice Blondel

In this country the name of Maurice Blondel is still hardly more than a name. He is known, perhaps, as a Catholic whose orthodoxy was at one time suspect, as a philosopher whose philosophy is not, and is far from being, neo-Thomist, and as a writer in French whose prose, in the opinion of the few having any first-hand acquaintance with it, might have been a literal translation from the German. Moreover, the publication of his works by the Presses universitaires de France has coincided with a period in British philosophy notoriously empiricist and anti-metaphysical. I see no prospect of Blondel being translated, and no exposition of his thought exists in English.[1] Yet in France, at the time of his death in June 1949, his reputation among academic thinkers was unexcelled. As an instance of what can be achieved by "the Christian in philosophy"[2] his work is, I venture to think, the most brilliant of this century. Blondel is properly to be compared with Malebranche, and not altogether improperly with Aquinas himself. To attempt, within the space of a short article, to present even the outlines of a system as wide-ranging in its scope as it is tight-knit in its logical texture would be absurd, just as, *a fortiori*, the critical appraisement which it merits would be impossible. All I can offer here is a brief introduction to the man and his writings, with some mention of those features of his thought which give it its distinctive force of character.

Born in 1861, Blondel was educated first at the *lycée* and then at the Faculty of Letters of his native Dijon, and afterwards at the famous Ecole Normale Supérieure, where he became the pupil of both Ollé-Laprune and Boutroux. His life was spent entirely in academic teaching, mainly at the University of Aix-Marseille, until

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[1] Apart from Katherine Gilbert, *Maurice Blondel's Philosophy of Action* (University of North Carolina, 1924), which is somewhat slight, takes no account of Blondel's later writings, and is now in any case unobtainable.

[2] The phrase is Dr J. V. Langmead Casserley's.

ill-health and growing blindness enforced his retirement. Much of the literary output of his latter years had to be dictated to an amanuensis, not seldom from a sick-bed. Yet what was done at the end was as closely argued, as firm in its grip, as the treatise with which he made his début and established his face. If the second edition of *L'Action* is more discursive or repetitive than the first it is only because of the author's anxiety to remove what he feared were the misleading obscurities and ambiguities which, on the book's original appearance, had caused so much controversy.

Blondel's *œuvres complètes* fall into two principal groups, each in the form of a trilogy. The first consists of *La Pensée* (2 vols, 1934), *L'Etre et les êtres* (1935), and the second edition of *L'Action* (2 vols, 1936–7); the second of *La Philosophie et l'esprit chrétien*, in two parts (1944–9), and *Exigences philosophiques du Christianisme* (1950). Since the appearance of these the first edition of *L'Action* has also been re-published—a reprint during his lifetime Blondel himself refused to sanction—as well as certain minor controversial works such as *Histoire et Dogme* (1904) and the *Lettre sur les exigences de la pensée en matière d'apologétique* (1896), which in particular had led Blondel's critics to accuse him of Modernism.[1] So much embarrassment indeed did these last-named cause him that for many years he published nothing further. His silence was broken only in 1923, with his tribute to the memory of Ollé-Laprune.[2] But in the interval he had concentrated on preparing the series of volumes which form the main body of his work as a writer. To the end he remained devout, hearing Mass daily, so long as his health permitted it.[3]

Blondel was a *philosophe de race*. He also was a convinced Christian. But, unlike Descartes, he could not keep his faith and his philosophy in separate compartments of his mind. His metaphysic is instinct with his experience as a believer, yet it must be judged—and on this Blondel was insistent—simply as a metaphysic: as an analysis, undertaken for its own sake exclusively, of what it means to be *human*. It is not therefore an apologetic. The philosophy of action is never offered to the reader as a means of inducing faith, like a ladder to be pushed aside once the ascent is made or a scaffolding to be dismantled when the building is complete. Arguments in behalf of the truth of Christianity, philosophical as well as historical, are needed as before. Some of these, in the past, have been good, others bad; they must be judged upon their own merits. Blondel's philosophy is not, however, even a preamble to belief. What the author claims to present is an interpretation of life which does no more (and no less) than point to the *need* of a supernatural revelation. If valid it will co-exist with faith; and its validity may be accepted, if accepted at all, even by those who do not see their way to the further

[1] Presses universitaires de France, 1956.

[2] Léon Ollé-Laprune. *L'achèvement et l'avenir de son œuvre* (Bloud et Gay, 1923).

[3] At his funeral the Archbishop of Aix declared: "C'est en voyant M. Blondel que j'ai compris ce que c'est qu'être à l'Eglise."

step of embracing Christianity itself. In a word, it purports to be a *Christian philosophy,* not a philosophy of the Christian religion. Nevertheless, its bearing upon the apologist's task is evident. Indeed, it was soon seen to imply a new type of apology altogether, for which the "extrinsicist" methods of old-fashioned orthodoxy would no longer suffice: an adequate approach to the intellectual problem of Christianity must deal, as Newman had perceived, rather with the "interior" fact of the human consciousness itself. On the call for a new apologetic, at the time when *L'Action* made its appearance, Blondel himself had no doubts; his *Letter* of 1896 is a pointed statement of his views. But controversy was uncongenial to him and, like von Hügel, he was not the man to pit himself against ecclesiastical authority, for which he had always the profoundest respect.

The eighties of the last century—Claudel's "tristes années quatre vingts"—marked the low ebb-tide of Catholic influence on the intellectual life of France. Ollé-Laprune was a revered but solitary figure. The age was one of dilettante scepticism and agnostic naturalism. Philosophical trends converged in a non-theistic idealism. The autonomous human mind was not the measure only, but the source of all things. In face of this insistence upon the "closed" world of the intelligence, the Christian claim to knowledge of a transcendent reality could seem only a pretentious illusion. In the jargon of the day, it was "heterogeneous". Moreover, the divine, being gratuitous, could not be morally obligatory. The burden of proof was considered, therefore, to rest upon those who asserted the necessity of a realm of being beyond the frontiers of knowledge accessible to the scientific reason. Certainly Christian belief could have no reputable epistemological status. Apart from its alleged sociological value religion, rationally viewed, was mere fideism, a *credo quia absurdum est.*

While still a student, Blondel had ambition enough to appoint himself the task of refuting this prevalent philosophical orthodoxy—or at least the burden of its case against Christianity. The nature of revelation seemed to him to have been radically misunderstood by it; as also, he was later to add, by much traditional theologizing. Revealed truth was not, he held, something *ab extra* and arbitrary. His aim would be to show rather that the idealist principle of immanence itself, when interpreted in the light of its concrete manifestations, is bound to raise the very problem to which religion, after its own manner, claimed to possess the answer. An analysis of the basic forms of human experience would, he believed, disclose a continuous dialectic for which there was no halting-place short of an option, positive or negative, before "the one sole necessity", *l'unique nécessaire.* Thought, that is to say, could not be isolated from volition; both were the differentiated expression of an original *élan,* an all-embracing dynamism to which man finds himself subject by the exigencies of his whole nature. This it is to which Blondel gives the name of *action.* The study of what he regarded as its concrete deployment or expansion engaged him for eleven years and forms the subject of his famous treatise *L'Action: Essai d'une critique de la vie et d'une science de la pratique,* published in 1893.

The novelty of Blondel's undertaking we to-day are hardly in a position to appreciate. The title of his book was itself a challenge. The approach to his subject was to be, not simply *a priori* and conceptual, according to the fashion of the times, but *a posteriori* and "intrinsicist". From the first, Blondel refused to waste time in the *cul-de-sac* of theory of knowledge. He was not interested in the definition of action; what was important was the fact of it, the complex and subtle processes of a reality which will not wait upon doctrinaire speculation. "The problem," he said, "is inevitable; man resolves it inevitably; and this solution, whether true or false—an expression of will as well as of necessity—each one of us carries in his actions. *Voilà pourquoi il faut étudier l'action.*"[1]

It thus becomes apparent that the scope of Blondel's inquiry is essentially ontological, not psychological. His starting-point is not, nor does he especially emphasize, any *inquiétude humaine* or *Angst*, man's conscious dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction indeed emerges clearly enough in his unfolding of the successive phases of action, in a way which often recalls Heidegger or Jaspers; but it is treated only as incidental evidence. (Blondel himself prefers to call it *la disproportion de l'homme.*) The metaphysical analysis, he claims, would hold good—the insufficiency of human effort, that is, would be as certain—were man actually in a state of perfect happiness. Nor is this insufficiency a character of his actions alone; it is as much a qualification of his thought, as in truth of his entire existence; for in the later works Blondel demonstrates the nature of the reciprocal presence, the interpenetration, of all three. Thought and action unite in being, and the manifold aspects of their relationship provide the architecture of his whole philosophical synthesis.

Action constitutes the thinker's primary datum. It is antecedent to every conscious inquiry and every deliberate choice: "I act, but without even knowing what action is, without having wished to be alive, without being aware precisely either who I am or even whether I am."[2] Man is therefore "situated", "engaged", involved he knows not why in the inevitable and irresistible movement of action. "Condemned to life, condemned to death", he cannot help himself. Yet everything he does carries with it a responsibility *éternellement lourde.* He cannot, having once existed, ever embrace non-existence; he is "condemned to eternity". Even suicide will not deliver him from the meshes of this determinism. Moreover, the dynamism of action—"ce dernier fond où, sans moi, malgré moi, je subis l'être et je m'y attache"—flows through him, making him what he is and impelling him towards self-realization.[3] But can he in fact achieve this

[1] *L'Action* (1893), p. viii. Cf. 2nd ed., ii, p. 16.

[2] The word *action* does not of course refer only to activity. Thought, *la pensée,* is itself "action", as the light which illuminates the field of volition. The action which Blondel is concerned to examine is the dynamism of the spiritual being as a whole.

[3] "S'il y a quelque chose à voir, j'ai besoin de le voir. J'apprendrai peut-être si, oui ou non, ce fantôme que je suis à moi-même, avec cet univers que je porte dans mon regard, avec la science et sa magie, avec l'étrange rêve de la conscience, a quelque solidité." Ibid.

self-realization? Are the potentialities of action in themselves sufficient? Is thought ever adequate to its object? Is even being, *être,* self-subsistent, self-explaining? It is with such questions as these that the curtain rises upon Blondel's metaphysical presentation of the drama of existence. Its "plot" will be to discover whether man, by the prospective powers of his mind, by the insatiable enterprise of his free activity, can in fact become the arbiter of his destiny; or whether in the last resort, if not sooner, he will find himself confronted by an unyielding obstacle—that very "heterogeneity" against which idealistic humanism is so anxious to preserve him.

Blondel's aim, we have said, is not the definition of action in abstract, generalizing terms, but the unfolding of its "hidden riches" —the stress falling on the adjective, *cachées.* There is, he points out, much more in action than the action itself. Human activity, however slight, has a wealth of latent significance which it is the task of the reflective understanding to discover. We are, as it were, dichotomized at the very root of our being between a boundless will to achieve and an ever-limited power of achievement. It is this discrepancy—nay, gulf—between the two which reveals the extent of our human infirmity. "Quelle chimère est ce donc que l'homme!"—again we hear Pascal's anguished cry. But our weakness is the sign of our strength. In the unending tension between what Blondel calls the *volonté voulante,* the primary urge or impulse of our nature, and the *volonté voulue,* the choices to which in fact we commit ourselves, lies the course of our existence in this world. The same duality emerges in the sphere of the reason also. On the one hand there is the *pensée pneumatique,* mind's prospective and synthetic function, and on the other, the *pensée noétique,* its retrospective and analytic function. The animating force, that is, of man's "noetic" thinking, his partial and defective analyses of the data of experience, is his more spontaneous "pneumatic" thinking, his unquenchable thirst to know, as potent in its way as his will to act. Even at the level of being itself, Blondel again distinguishes: *être limité* is not the same thing as *être total.* All being is subject to this dialectic. Thought and action are its expression and have their unity within it. Yet the inadequacy of will to realize will, of thought to articulate thought, of being to attain being, in their plenitude and perfection—*hinc, hinc illae lacrimae.* The drama of existence is in fact a tragedy, or would be but for the "fourth act" which, as we gradually perceive, all that precedes it necessitates. For the final terms of the dialectic, already anticipated at every stage of its expansion, is Being itself—God, in the language of faith. The divine, therefore, is not a *Deus ex machina,* a sudden incursion of absolute "otherness", unforeseen and inexplicable, but a reconciliation and synthesis of all those antinomies by which existence, as we experience it, is for ever bounded. For God is the "cause" of that which is, the ultimate source, in his pure creative activity, of the countless secondary causes which, although in the eyes of the non-believer they seem autonomous, without him could not operate. And every stage of the dialectic points in the end to a necessary option: man must choose in face of a vital

issue; and choose he does, whether he is conscious of it or not. His very existence affirms what his reason may prompt him to deny.

Thus in our thought there is far more than our thought. Were we not destined to attain a unified understanding we should be incapable of rationality. And were we not fitted for rational thinking we should be equally incapable of real knowledge. So by the same paradox there is more in our being than simply our being. We should have no sense of our insufficiency and relativity did we not participate in some reality that is absolute and perfect. We should not even be aware of ourselves as a succession of "states of being" but for some uniting, integrating force, above all process of becoming, which synthesizes them for us. Finally, as we have already seen, there is more in our action than our action. Our will is for ever reaching out beyond our choice or achievement; and this it does by some natural, universal, irrepressible impulse of our nature from which we are unable, as living, thinking, willing entities, to detach ourselves.

Hence by a threefold analysis Blondel finds himself led to an identical conclusion: transcendent Being is immanent in every form and phase of our experience.[1] There is something within us which also is not *of* us, which is both antecedent and ulterior to us, yet apart from which we remain an enigma. This reality to which we belong, by which we exist, lies at the root of our humanity and informs its whole substance. It is not *ganz andere*. There is no question of an overthrow of "nature" by supervening "grace". Nor, from a different point of view, is it a mere postulate of the reason. Supernature is not a possible *explanation* of experience; it belongs to its essence. It is that by virtue of which reason, *la pensée*, itself functions. Man is called by God not at moments only, but in his continuant experience, and by every potentiality of his being. Moreover, as the supernatural is itself ineluctable so the problem of its existence is ever recurrent: man's intellect perpetually returns to it. Thus in strictness *atheist* is a self-contradictory term. Some plainly there are who cannot perceive the most intimate reality of which they are possessed; some also who deny it. God to them is unknown, unknowable or non-existent. Others there are who are reluctant to admit him for fear of reducing infinity to a myth, as well as those who from weakness repudiate what the moral conscience presses upon them. The paradox is that all these in their several ways testify to the presence of the obligation of which they try to acquit themselves.

We thus are bound to face the question of the divine existence and to answer it. Nevertheless, the philosopher *qua* philosopher can, tem-

[1] Blondel has always been careful to speak of his philosophy as a *method*, not a doctrine, of immanence. "Il s'agit . . . de chercher les préparations profondes sans lesquelles l'urgent appel de la charité divine resterait lettre morte et intrusion inexplicable et inadmissible pour nous. Au regard du philosophie même il peut donc y avoir un examen à faire des titres qui confèrent au don surnaturel un caractère moral et la valeur d'un bienfait, tout inespéré et onéreux qu'il peut paraître" (*Le problème de la philosophie catholique*, 1932, p. 12). To Blondel's critics, however—as to certain of his disciples—the doctrine seemed implicit in the method.

porarily at least, parenthesize it and confine himself to the task of phenomenological analysis. He will observe that each stage of the dialectic has its proper validity, its autonomous standards and its appropriate ends. Provided that no intermediate stage is considered as ultimate human values find their proper place, and Christian and humanist can join hands. But the former will insist that his own interpretation of these values is the uniquely sufficient one, as alone viewing life in its full moral and spiritual dimensions. Blondel's immanentism, however, does not make him an optimist, if by that is meant the somewhat facile confidence with which we are apt to associate all nineteenth-century idealism. He knows—none better—that we are confronted with a momentous choice, since what we are and become turns upon our moral freedom. But neither is he a pessimist. Our whole nature, he argues, is caught up in the determinism of action—*sans moi, malgré moi, je subis l'être et je m'y attache*; yet our solution of the problem which action poses would be a pessimistic one only if negative: an acceptance, in the manner of Sartre, of *le néant* as its sole end. The pessimism which in the opening chapters of *L'Action* Blondel had in view was of course the then current vogue of Schopenhauer.[1] But his case against pessimism, that it is a contradiction, since there can be no conception of and hence no free and deliberate will for *le néant, l'anéantissement,* applies both to existentialist atheism and to that dilettante but also essentially pessimistic curiosity, that "obsession with phenomena", of which André Gide was to become the living symbol.[2] Blondel's own attitude is rather one of due moral seriousness, a consciousness of what the issues of life finally involve. The insights, in this respect, of the plain man are enough; the metaphysician can only endorse them: "The quite simple way in which the popular consciousness sees the problem of our destiny as a choice, personal to each one of us, between good and evil, between the order of God and the sway of egoism, accords with the profoundest tensions of the interior life."[3] To live solely for the sake of living is in the end "cruel and absurd". Man searches in vain either within himself, or outside himself, in science or in the universe at large: he remains always alone, yet cannot be content to remain so. "The more he knows, the more he has and is, the more he feels that he has not and is not what he wills."[4] The reader's mind goes back, inevitably, to Pascal's *Dépendence, désir d'indépendence, besoin*; as, once more, when Blondel confronts us with the crucial issue of man's recognition of the *one sole necessity*: "All determinism leads us to this term, for in it originates the very determinism

[1] The second edition of *L'Action* makes no mention of Sartre, and certainly the difference between Blondel and the existentialists must not be minimized. Blondel is a metaphysician, but his method repeatedly brings to mind the phenomenological descriptions characteristic of existentialism.

[2] "Ce qui n'a point de cohérence ni de consistance intelligible ne subsiste qu'en prenant corps dans des actions qui, elles, réalisent en des vies désordonnées et en des œuvres intimement discordantes ces sophismes intéressés de la pensée et de la volonté défaillantes" (*L'Action,* 1893, p. 39). These words read like a proleptic criticism of Gide, and especially of *Les Nourritures terrestres.*

[3] P. 356.

[4] Ibid., p. 356.

whose whole meaning is to bring us to this end"—a comment, surely, on the Pascalian text: "S'il y a un seul principe de tout, une seule fin de tout, tout par lui, tout pour lui."[1]

The philosophy of action, in its determinative character, is voluntaristic. "One penetrates the living reality only by placing oneself at the dynamic point of view of the will."[2] The will in us is sovereign; our experience is its instrument and expression; objects are subordinated to it, continued in it, transcended by it. Action in truth is *subjectivity*—"a word", Blondel says, "which needs to be better defined". But he was not, as he repeatedly stressed, an irrationalist. His aim was simply "to make more and more profoundly intelligible what is not immediately and specifically intellectual",[3] since if the progress of action causes that of thought, it is the progress of thought which also determines and conditions that of action. That his standpoint was pragmatist in the Peirce-James sense, he resolutely denied.

The fact that Blondel's is a philosophy in the grand manner is not, I am aware, likely nowadays to commend it in this country; whereas on the Continent there is abundant evidence of its growing influence, especially upon the younger Catholic thinkers,[4] and studies in what is now called *le blondélisme* appear at frequent intervals. This should remind us, since the reminder is necessary, of the abiding challenge which any serious claim in behalf of the truth of religion necessarily throws down. In so far as Christianity is not mere fideism, or antiquarian biblicism, it is bound to present itself at the bar of the rational understanding, in regard not only to its inner coherence, its theological aspect proper, but for the scrutiny of its bases and its implications for human experience as a whole. Faith cannot be detached from reason, nor theology from its philosophic outworks. For Blondel, religious belief poses a question which is anterior to any attempt at verifying it on purely historical grounds; a truth which to-day is too often forgotten or set aside. No presentation of the Christian case in purely historical terms is likely to remove, for the educated mind of this century, any of the preliminary stumbling-blocks, as Bultmann has correctly pointed out. Unless religion can offer an interpretation of life as a contemporary sees it it can offer nothing. Hence the need, in every generation, of a renewed effort at evolving a Christian philosophy. In our day theology has been led, by the *ignis fatuus* of a largely reactionary movement, into intellectual isolationism. On the side of academic philosophy preoccupation with logistic and a dogmatizing empiricism have completed the severance. To those, however, who still hope for some way out of this *impasse* the example of Blondel may well give encouragement of eventual progress.

B. M. G. Reardon.

[1] The relation of Blondel's thought to Pascal generally is admirably treated by D. M. Eastwood, *The Revival of Pascal* (1936), ch. vii.

[2] *L'Action*, p. 100.

[3] *Bull. de la Soc. française de Philosophie*, 1902, p. 190.

[4] Discernible, moreover, in Dom Illtyd Trethowan's *An Essay in Christian Philosophy* (Longmans, 1954).

Vocation and Office

THE correspondence in THEOLOGY last year on the subject of marriage and celibacy illustrated a widespread confusion of thought about what constitutes "vocation". There has been an increasing use of the word in recent years and it has been valuable in encouraging men and women to discover purpose in their daily lives, but is there not a danger that its effectiveness is being lost through lack of definition and over-pious usage?

Much of the confusion derives from a suggestion that a "vocation" is synonymous with an "occupation of God's arrangement" or with an "occupation whose inherent purpose is Christ-like or spiritual"; that "vocation" can be discovered and fulfilled in "occupation" qua "occupation". From a worldly viewpoint a priest's vocation is the most obvious and seems to be fulfilled in "the parson's job". Assuming this to be the pattern for all vocation, it is easy to draw the conclusion that certain other occupations (medicine, nursing, teaching, etc.), which in themselves have a Christ-like quality or whose purpose derives from something higher than material economy, are themselves vocations (cp. "vocational training" applied to certain professions in common usage). This, however, intolerably leaves the majority of human beings outside or on a lower level of vocation, (witness the furor in the press a few years ago when a church leader gave the impression that nursing was a superior vocation to being a typist), and many clergy, anxious that the person of average ability should not be left without a sense of purpose in his work no matter how material, have been quick to suggest that *all* occupations, provided they are not evil, can be vocations—that God is calling every man, no matter how humble, to his special "job".

The dangers of these assumptions are both theological and practical. The theological implication is that occupations qua occupations have a sacramental quality. They are made the media of the direct meeting between God and the individual, the setting in which God speaks to man in the world and the means for man's discovery and total fulfilment of his life's purpose. The practical dangers are only too obvious at the present time in relation to those in the so-called "vocations" as much as to those in more mundane "jobs". At the one extreme it is possible for doctors, teachers, etc., to become so convinced that their occupation itself is their vocation and so satisfied with the sense of purpose and achievement that their work brings them, that their occupation becomes their religion. The work itself becomes their Christ, their Church, their Sacrament, their direct media with God and their means of total fulfilment. At the other extreme there are many who, in these days of mass-production, specialized economies and frustrated labour, may never discover God nor their life's purpose if they are encouraged to seek their vocation directly in their occupation. Anyone who has lived in a mining village or in an economy which severely limits the range of occupations available for the individual's choice: anyone who has lived in an area of mass unemployment where material necessity is the opera-

tive factor in a man's choice of occupation: in fact, anyone who is familiar with the way in which a person of average ability is compelled to choose an occupation to-day, must recognize how meaningless and dangerous it is to suggest an equation between vocation and "job". If people are given the impression that God is a Grand Economist calling them to God-appointed occupations, then the less fortunate may be excused for acquiring a very warped picture of the wise and loving God. They have the right, too, to demand of the Church its own economic theory to ensure that men will have a completely free choice when God calls.

Surely there is a need to return to the limited usage of the New Testament. When Paul says (1 Cor. 7. 20) "Let each man abide in that calling wherein he was called", he adds immediately "Wast thou called *being* a bondservant . . .", making a distinction between a man's "calling" and the occupation a man happens to be in when "calling" is heard. "Calling" throughout the New Testament is the description of a specific and essentially religious experience. It is God's demand for man's love and allegiance through fellowship with and through the mediation of Jesus Christ. As it transcends "works" it transcends "occupation". It is a call which first draws man's attention away from the world and himself. (Of those who respond Jesus says "They are not of the world"; in 2 Pet. 1 the Christian vocation is to become "partakers of the divine nature"; cp. also 1 Thess. 2. 12; Rom. 8. 30; 1 Tim. 6. 12; 1 Pet. 5. 10.) But this heavenward call is only possible through Jesus Christ and vocation is therefore to Jesus "to be with him" (Mark 3. 14). The first men ever to be called were called out of their occupations "to be with him". (Cp. also Rev. 17. 14 where those who are "called and chosen and faithful" are those who "are with him"; Rom. 1. 6, ". . . are ye also called to be Jesus Christ's"; and 1 Cor. 1. 9 and Heb. 9. 15.) For us to-day this of course means a vocation to Christ in his Body, the Church. When Paul says (Ephes. 1. 18) "that ye may know what is the hope of his calling", his following creed-like statement, which in fact gives Christ as "the hope", ends "and gave him to be head over all things to the church which is his body". (Cp. also Ephes. 4. 1 and Col. 3. 15.)

In practice, then, vocation is a calling to Christ in his Church. There is one vocation for priest and layman, professional man and simple labourer—"even as ye were called in one hope of your calling". All have the same responsibility to accept as they have the same opportunity to hear. All have the same blessing of hope and purpose in life which Christ's call brings. It is vital that lay people should be aware that their vocation to the Church is the same positive and pressing call that the priest hears—that they are not "the people left behind in the pews" after the priests have been called out—left to go out into the world in search of the real fulfilment of their lives.

Acceptance of vocation will inevitably lead to service, but service essentially as Christ's body—in being the Church. In the one Body, however, "all members have not the same office" and the distinction between priest and layman in their one vocation lies in the nature of their membership and function, their "office". But this distinction

in service within the Body must also be apparent when the Church impinges on the world in service of the Kingdom. Office within the Church, then, will become a critical factor in understanding how a man's vocation to Christ will relate to his service in the world—in his occupation. The very nature of the relationship will be different for priest and layman because of the difference in office. This is the factor which is ignored when the priest's occupation is wrongly used as the pattern of all so-called "vocations". The distinction is surely this. A priest's occupation is defined by his office. The framework of his daily life is itself sacred and dedicated by its relationship with his office. He accepts the two together. The layman's service, however, is to *make* his occupation, whatever it may be, whatever its origin or its worldly purpose, dedicated and sacred by his office in the Church —to "baptize" his occupation by his "royal priesthood" of laity with the real authority of his office. In the priest's case, the Church recognizes the special relationship between office and occupation both in its ordination rite and in the special powers of discipline over the priest's daily life which it claims; ordination contains specific principles for the organization of daily life ("to be messengers, watchmen, stewards"; "to teach and to premonish, to feed and provide for the Lord's family, to seek Christ's sheep . . ."; "to study"; "daily reading and weighing of the scriptures"). And then "inthronization", "induction" or "licensing" witness to the fact that it is the Church which gives the ordained officer his specific occupation—that it is not a matter of his own application. In the case of the layman, the Church acknowledges a lack of definitive relationship between office and occupation in its doctrine of "the Fall". In the inherited economy of a world which, apart from God's intervention (Christ in his Church), has "fallen", secular occupations—even the so-called "vocations"—can be, in themselves, no more than neutral. Secular occupations can contain both sincere Christians and sincere non-Christians without illogicality. It would be nonsense to say this of the priesthood.

All this is of great practical significance. For the priest, every choice which affects the arrangement of his daily life, while it may not be "vocational" in the true sense of the word, nevertheless is a consideration of office. Thus, on the one hand, the common practice of labelling many personal decisions—albeit prayerful decisions—"vocations" is suspect. (How often a false note is struck when a priest talks about his vocation "to accept a living" or "to marry", etc., raising these decisions to the level of acceptance of Christ himself.) On the other hand, a priest must know that every such decision is not a matter of his own personal choice but must be in accord with the special discipline of the Church and the principles laid down by his ordination. Matters such as "place of work", "how far to become involved in secular work", "the rights and wrongs of a priest-workman experiment", "marriage or celibacy", etc., all relate directly to the discipline of office. In the special problem of marriage and celibacy, as last year's controversy demonstrated, it seems as unwise to call either a vocation as to say that a priest has the same freedom of

choice as the layman. Surely it is a question of office and not directly vocation. The Eastern Church certainly implies this in its complicated disciplines, and, where the Roman Church has not made this clear, it has given the impression that celibacy is a better way of accepting Christ's vocation to himself than marriage. The Anglican Church, while leaving the actual decision to the individual priest, makes it clear that it is not merely a personal choice but one relating to his service.

For the layman, the practical advantages of emphasizing the lack of definitive relationship between office and occupation are twofold. At the one extreme, the man who gives himself to an occupation which in itself does bring a sense of purpose and satisfaction will know that, even if he has been conditioned for it by God's gifts and opportunities as well as by a neutral world economy, his vocation will not be fulfilled *by* it but *within* it—that his work cannot stand in place of his service to Christ in the Church, his office. He will know that his occupation itself has still to be made into "the working out in the world of his service to Christ in the Church, to whom he is called". At the other extreme, the man whose occupation seems to have been forced upon him entirely by a world indifferent to God and cannot see even a satisfying worldly purpose in it can learn that his vocation can still be fulfilled within it. Looking instead to Christ he may see how Jesus himself fulfilled his own vocation. Jesus' special vocation for his earthly life was to be and to work in this world "at one" with his heavenly Father. His calling led to his special service for God in the world—the redemption of the world. In that "office" conditions of the world not of God's choosing were forced upon him, the pointless, meaningless suffering, the nails and the cross. But Jesus accepted them, using them for his office as the Redeemer. Faithful throughout to his at-one-ness with God he brought all the purpose and meaning of God's mission of atonement into the otherwise meaningless crucifixion. How many there are who spend their lives in frustrating labour who could have their lives infused with meaning if they could only be persuaded to look to Christ's example, to seek the atoned relationship with God in his Church (vocation) and then to be the Church in the world (office) in faithful service no matter what the circumstances of their lives in the world.

Much of what has been said in this article may be a statement of the obvious, but it is the writer's belief that the practical dangers involved in our too free use of the word "vocation" warrants a careful study, and it is his hope that someone much more capable than himself will undertake it.

H. Noel Swinburne.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

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CORRESPONDENCE

THE MARRIAGE OF THE UNBAPTIZED

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

It is not difficult to sympathize with the problems raised by the Rev. Geoffrey Edwards in connexion with the marriage of the unbaptized. No doubt the Prayer Book assumes that those to be married in church will have been baptized (and confirmed?). Unfortunately, however, baptism in this country, through its largely indiscriminate administration could only be (in the main) a merely *technical* qualification for "a full church wedding". For the purpose of allowing or refusing such a wedding, would it not be hard to discriminate, with a good conscience, between a person who has been baptized in infancy, and yet has never fulfilled the implications of his Christian Initiation, and somebody who has never been baptized at all? The one would qualify—in Mr Edwards' view—for full Christian marriage; the other would not. Yet neither could be described as a practising Christian.

A similar difficulty arises when confirmed Godparents are insisted upon. If the parents are not confirmed and have no confirmed relatives or friends, this insistence (rightly or wrongly) serves as an effective barrier. But if Uncle Fred and Auntie Flo and Cousin Jack have all been confirmed—even though they may have excommunicated themselves many years ago—the *technical* requirements can be satisfied.

Yours faithfully,

BRYAN W. JONES.

659 FILTON AVENUE,
FILTON,
BRISTOL.

SECT OR CHURCH?

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Mr Browning in his letter "Sect or Church?" in your May issue says "the proposal for more bishops with smaller dioceses [means that they will be] necessarily with less influence in public affairs and probably scanty equipment to guide the presbyters". This does not follow.

Such a reform should carry with it a proposal for more provinces and therefore archbishops. This would fit in interestingly with Canon Wickham's proposal for better organization of the Church at city and national levels. Bishops with dioceses at (roughly) local government unit sizes, e.g. city, rural district and urban district, would have a far greater impact on the general life of the country than at present, while six (?) archbishops, largely freed from their diocesan responsibilities by suffragans, would be able to bring to bear on national affairs the best qualities that the Church can provide.

Also, I cannot believe that such bishops would have "scanty equipment to guide the presbyters". It may be difficult to find men to fill the office of bishop as at present conceived, but our Church has never lacked men of ability who are fine pastors, who would be more than competent to guide and administer a small diocese if they were relieved of national responsibilities.

Yours faithfully,

TIMOTHY BEAUMONT.

2 DERBY ROAD,
KOWLOON TONG,
HONG KONG.

LAMBETH PRAYERS

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Mr Carey has been using the prayer under consideration *in spite of* its difficulties and *because* he is not clear what it means: a curious championship of bad construction. More important is it that the congregation, hearing the prayer, shall pray it with understanding; and one wonders whether two or three members of it would be found to agree on any one interpretation.

Private devotion may draw sustenance from meditation on the events of our Lord's incarnate life, but the Church should formulate her official prayers on the basis of the actual relationship that now exists between the Ascended Lord and the Spirit-filled Body of which he is the Head. Metaphors, analogies, references to Gospel incidents should be used with discrimination lest they confuse rather than illuminate, and minister to a lower level of Christian thought. It is one thing to speak of the Father stretching forth his right hand (an obvious metaphor), another to speak of the bishop doing so (a sacramental act), and still another to speak of Jesus of Nazareth doing it on occasions in Palestine nineteen centuries ago. To treat these three different things as analogous without careful discrimination is confusing.

The prayer is built on a theory of the nature of the Church, which is fashionable in some quarters and agreeable to Mr Carey. Is it true? While theologians work that out in controversy with others who hold

different theories, let the prayer-writers follow a respectable distance behind along the well-worn paths.

Ewhurst Rectory,
Robertsbridge,
Sussex.

Yours faithfully,
K. A. Pearson.

RELIGION AND THE WORKING CLASSES

To the Editor of Theology.

Dear Sir,

In his article entitled "Religion and the Working Classes" in the May issue of Theology, Dr Buchanan, writing of Canon Wickham's book, *Church and People in an Industrial Society*, refers to "one omission in this account which is surprising because of its relevance to the main theme of the book. He makes no attempt to describe the religious attitudes of the working classes, or the indigenous religious institutions in which these attitudes have occasionally expressed themselves." May I refer to another "surprising" omission? Canon Wickham could not, of course, include accounts of every attempt that has been made in connexion with what he calls "Industrial Mission", but one might reasonably have expected to find at least a reference to some of the Roman Catholic Secular Institutes, both in England and oversea, who are translating into practice the theory which "is, of course, impeccable that the laity dispersed into the life of the world means permeation, influence, are effective Christian transformation" (p. 226). Mr Wood in the July Theology refers to an article on the Little Brothers and Sisters of de Foucauld (Theology, April 1952).

Many of the Brothers have been working for several years in the industrial and mining districts of France and Belgium. Canon Wickham states (p. 231), "there is no organizational expression of the Church deployed into the secular 'frontier' positions". But there *is*, and has been for many years, though not, as yet, in the Church of England (although movements comparable to the Secular Institutes are to be found in the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States). I refer your readers to *Seeds of the Desert*, by R. Voillaume (Burns Oates, 1955), and *Our Time is Now, A Study of some Modern Congregations and Secular Institutes*, by Mary O'Leary (Burns Oates, 1955). Instead of merely holding conferences or "talking with men during working periods where the processes allow, at lunch breaks and shift changes, and after working hours in informal groups", these dedicated men (and women) are, in many parts of the world, "an industrial mission concerned with face-to-face relationships with everybody in industry" (op. cit., p. 241). I suggest that their work and methods should be studied and, if possible, adapted to our own situation.

One last note. Mr Dobson, writing in Theology for July, asks that attention should be given to the "working class" of the farming community and asks, "What hope is there of a revival?" Again I refer

to the Secular Institutes, some of whose members are working in French farming communities and who are confronted with a situation equally desperate as that with which many English country parsons are faced to-day.

Yours faithfully,

H. P. SAUNDERS.

HOLY TRINITY VICARAGE,
OSWESTRY,
SHROPSHIRE.
16 *July* 1958.

THE CHURCH AND THE FARMING COMMUNITY

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

There is another view of the Church in a farming community, no less, if no more true than Canon Dobson's, and perhaps more useful evangelically.

A village community is a unit of society. It is also a unit of the Holy Church, which includes *all* the inhabitants in so far as all are baptized. We do not expect that all the persons of a local church shall each have all the Christian virtues; but we, each one of us, supply something towards the worthiness of the whole. We therefore, who worship regularly, worship not for ourselves, but on behalf of all. In our Holy Communion they all partake. Similarly we (communicants) share the benefit of the fine lives of some who never go to church. All of us in the Holy Church give our various excellencies into the common lot. We all thank God for the lives of the others, and all benefit by all.

This conception of the village community in England was clouded by the invention of an "electoral roll". This roll was made for administrative convenience, and has no theological meaning at all. It has been misconstrued as an attempt to separate the wheat from the tares, and even blamed because it does not. Rigorists have sought to substitute for it a communicants' roll as a more effective winnowing. It would be so, but at the cost of denying the truth of that parable.

It is impossible to draw a line in a village community between good churchmen (or good Christians) and the rest. If we take a list of communicants, we include some "pharisees, hypocrites", who will be preceded in the kingdom of God by some "publicans and harlots", whom we exclude. And we exclude some whose lives are Christlike but who will not worship in church.

To return to an incumbent's dilemma. I suggest that he ceases to draw a (mental) line between churchgoers and the rest. Let all be held in honour as part of the Church. Let the worshippers worship on behalf of, and give thanks for the virtues of, the whole parish.

After all, our Lord seemed to have as much sympathy with "sinners", who neglected their religious duties, as with those who kept them.

Yours truly,

J. A. H. Bell.

Little Parrock,
Grasmere,
Ambleside,
Westmorland.

A correspondent has called our attention to another interpretation of the parable of the Unjust Steward in an article by the Rev. R. G. Lunt which was contributed to the *Expository Times* in August 1955. —Ed. Theology.

BOOK REVIEWS

Communism and the Theologians. By Charles West. S.C.M. Press. 35s.

Dr West is Assistant Director of the Ecumenical Institute at Geneva and describes this impressive work as a "Study of an Encounter". His concern is not to add one more to the many analyses of communism but to concentrate on the living response of Christians to the living force of communism. He assumes that there is one conviction shared by communists and Christians, that values are not to be sought in the realm of ideas, in systems, but in the living relation of concrete human beings.

The fundamental challenge of communism to the theologians consists in the suggestion that Christianity is only another ideology over against the communist one. A further point is the Marxist doctrine of history with its prophetic role obscured by the questionable claim to be "scientific". How far do the theologians understand the revolutionary ferment of our time, and how far can they put themselves "in the proletarian situation", how effective are they in facing problems of social construction in a changing world and how does Christian thought confront the massive humanism of the communists? But the encounter also involves the question of Christian action. In some lands Christians have responsibility for power. What should be the attitude of Christians to "anti-communism"? What creative alternatives are there to communist order in the state? How can there be a Christian ministry to the communist as a person?

Dr West begins by considering the purely polemical response which regards communism as the enemy to be fought. Emil Brunner is taken as the foremost exponent of this position. The contrasting position is that of Hromadka and certain Hungarian Christians who see in communism both judgment and hope, and endeavour to make it possible for the Christian to live in a way both acceptable to communist power and the Christian faith. Both these positions display

a longing of a "kulturchristliche" unity of religion with social power, Dr West suggests. Both Dulles and Hromadka, the extremes of position in regard to communism, think of a faith in culture informed by a unifying religion and as such weaken the freedom of the Christian.

There follows a discussion of the "Religious Socialism" of Paul Tillich with a somewhat inadequate appendix on Berdyaev. Catholic writers are not discussed. It is suggested that Tillich fails to make an encounter with Marxism because he is enclosed in his own ontological system and his Marxism is so "religiously re-explained" as to be no longer truly itself.

Reinhold Niebuhr is taken as an example of the American Encounter. Niebuhr found in Marxism a clue to the problems of the Ford workers in Detroit in the 'twenties. He was a socialist in the 'thirties and in a nation caught up in the relativities and responsibilities of a great power he has continued to endeavour to give a prophetic word in "an anteroom of the state department". But Niebuhr's socialism has given way to a typically American pragmatism. It is the power of God and not of man which opens the way to Christian action, and the Christian encounter with the earthly power of communism must find its first resource in God's commission to reach the communist with both truth and love and only secondly in a strategic resistance to his political power. The section on Niebuhr is detailed (Dr West is clearly in some ways deeply indebted to him), but the criticism is shrewd. Niebuhr's pragmatic realism, taken out of the American context, sounds to others like ideology—the emphasis on "free nations" against tyranny is not helpful to nations which see the danger of two great power colossi. M. M. Thomas and others in India, greatly influenced by Niebuhr's theology, find it necessary to amend it and show a greater understanding of the dynamic revolutionary movements in Asia and Africa. They have a greater understanding of communism as an appealing faith and a distorting power woven into the texture of revolutionary change. Niebuhr remains too much the Christian-in-society to appreciate the full value of Christian witness when it is powerless, and his criticism of the pretensions of the Church far outweigh his constructive statements about its vocation.

A very large part of the book is devoted to a study of Karl Barth. Barth has a socialistic background and much of his theology represents an attack on all forms of ideology in the name of revelation. A careful study of this section will make it clear why Barth has refused to give the same decisive "no" to communism that he gave to Nazism. His importance in a book of this kind is largely because of his influence on younger men in direct contact with communism. Barth is essentially "the preacher-in-the-church" as Niebuhr is "the Christian-in-the-world", and his emphasis on the Resurrection victory sometimes makes him irresponsible in his attitude to real human beings and their problems. But Barth does insist that the central concern of the Christian is the concrete human being. "Right itself becomes wrong when it is allowed to rule as an abstract form . . .

man has not to serve causes; causes have to serve man." Barth's Christological understanding of the state breaks the habit of negative thinking about the state in protestantism without falling into the opposite tendency of liberal idealism. Dr West thinks that throughout Barth's theology Marx's revolutionary impulse to society is taken seriously, but the communist ideal of socialist construction is outbid by the reality of redemption. Conservatism such as that of Brunner has no place in this way of thinking and the ethical dualism of the old Lutheranism is anathema for Barth. Like Marx he reveals and repudiates the concealed self-justification, the political irresponsibility satisfied with the *status quo* or in flight to the security of an ecclesiastical haven which this ethic implies. For Barth the Christian is free to be for the world as Christ is for the world. More successfully than any other theologian discussed in this book, he maintains that the Christian is to be radical towards every political system, more than the communist himself, and yet at the same time more constructive and positive than any idealist in discovering the true service of the state.

Barth refuses to give his blessing to the anti-communist crusade because it is not, like Nazism, a "nihilistic rebellion against Christian faith and morals but a secular corruption of these, at once more dangerous in its self-righteousness and more admirable in many of its fruits". Dr West thinks that he lacks insight because of a certain lack of political acumen, for he applies his theology to political problems in a somewhat slapdash fashion. It has been the task of disciples of Barth in daily contact with communism to make a different contribution, and Dr West has much to say of Gollwitzer and other Christians in East Germany. This leads to his final chapter, in which he sums up what he believes to be the nature of the Christian Encounter with communism, and this deserves most careful attention. He sees the world attaining secular maturity—Tillich, Niebuhr and Barth all affirm this. Tillich finds autonomy a legitimate condition of the spirit and Berdyaev is the great exponent of freedom, of creative ethics. Barth who rejects every attempt to build up a world view or ideology of religious truth does this in order to show how God in Christ reconciles the world in the relative realities of its secular life. Niebuhr again insists that the Christian must never separate himself from the area of relative and responsible decision, but it is Dietrich Bonhoeffer who insists that the maturity of the technical world within the limits of its own problem-solving concerns is a fact of God's providence demanding respect. Marx brought home to the secular world that its basic principles are not only relative; they are corrupt. Problems are solved certainly, but in the interest of some against the interest of others. The laws of morals and economics turn out to be expressions of the ideology of the liberal business man. Marxism has kept the secular world mindful of the danger of turning working hypotheses into absolute principles. To recall men to a "religious ideology" is of little avail. In the midst of this secular mature world Christ reveals to us God's love. I am set in this world and there I find the reality of the world reconciled in the

reality of God. This is what Bonhoeffer meant by the "non-religious nature of Christian faith". Jesus was "the man-for-others", powerless, suffering for our sins. Man's religiosity looks for God as power, a *deus ex machina,* but the Bible points to the powerlessness and suffering of God. The Christian is called to be a man pure and simple, to share the being of Christ in the world, a part of it, sharing is problems. This encounter may not be in words at first but in participation in common life. It involves a profound affirmation of the world and the deepest freedom from it. The book ends with the three themes dealt with throughout the study. Ideology, philosophy of history, humanist ideals and Christian "co-humanity" and the "gateway to Action"—the problem of power, of creative alternatives, the renewal of the Church and Christian ministry to the communist and under conditions of communist rule.

This is certainly a book which deserves careful study. It is a little heavy and Germanic in style, and indeed most of the theologians considered come from the German background. The choice of quotations is admirable and gives much material to English-speaking readers otherwise not available, but British thinking is conspicuous by its absence. John Macmurray is rather contemptuously dismissed as a "leftist clergyman" of the 'thirties, surely an odd reference to a much-loved and greatly respected Edinburgh philosopher. William Temple is never mentioned and does not appear in the index. A misprint is to be found on page 339, "word" should read "world". Those who find the theological analysis heavy going will none the less find great value in the final chapter with its moving quotations.

L. M. Schiff.

Bangalore.

Dean Church. By B. A. Smith. Oxford University Press. 30s.

Bishop Henson once advised a friend to soak himself in one man's works, and sent a parcel of books containing such second-hand copies of the writings of Dean Church as the bishop's bookseller could supply.

The bishop and the dean had much in common. Both were deeply loyal to the Church of England, while frankly admitting that, as in the case of other branches of the Christian Church, its life fell far short of its claims. Both were concerned with holiness of life. Both liked plain words, distrusting in their writings what was showy or ornate.

Mr Smith has written a scholarly study of the mind and writings of Dean Church, and has gathered together what is known of his life. With characteristic reserve, Church left few private papers which would serve as material for a full-length biography, and there is not much to add in this respect to the *Life and Letters of Dean Church,* edited by his daughter and published in 1894, four years after his death. The new material, however, though small in quantity, is of

great interest, as it shows how the dean, in close touch with Mr Gladstone, influenced church appointments and policy while he was at St Paul's. One would not have gathered, for example, from Davidson's life of Tait, that Church counted for much in ecclesiastical affairs. Mr Smith has used the Gladstone papers in the British Museum to present a different and more accurate picture.

Mr Smith does full justice to Church's knowledge and ability in matters of science and culture, where the theologians of his time were not often at home or well informed. To describe the dean as a journalist is fair enough, if one drops the suggestion of craving for popular appeal which has gathered round the word, and retains it to describe a man who writes well and with sound knowledge about a wide variety of interesting topics. Few scholars have been as capable as Church was of appreciating the merits of Dante, the influence of Christianity upon civilization, and at the same time to take a lively interest in the new scientific knowledge that came flooding in about the middle of the nineteenth century. His correspondence with the American botanist, Asa Gray, served him well in helping him to take the measure of the theory of evolution, and to condemn the "shortness of thought" which led many scared churchmen into indefensible positions.

Among the works of Dean Church are three volumes of village sermons which have received hard treatment. Mr Smith joins with the author of the *D.N.B.* article on Church in thinking poorly of them. He speaks of the work which went into their preparation as "irksome, and a dissipation of his talents", adding that most people will find them dreary reading to-day. There is, however, another view of them. In these sermons, Church is concerned with Christian faith and duty, themes which seemed to him so grave that all "traces of the literary man" in handling them would have been out of place. Towards the end of his life, Church said that to turn from secular literature to the psalms was like leaving a room full of company and conversation to go out under the stars. The simile is not too far out in describing the change of feeling when one turns, for example, from his essays and reviews to the village sermons. It is quite true that there is a gravity and sense of the eternal in all his writings. But it is in the sermons that we come out into the open, underneath the stars.

A. C. Scupholme.

Thurcaston Rectory,
Leicester.

The End of the Modern World: A Search for Orientation. By Romano Guardini. Sheed and Ward. 8s. 6d.

Survivors from the nineteenth century are conscious that the world to-day is a different place from the world into which they were born. For that matter, far younger men and women apprehend more or less confusedly that a radical transformation is going on. It is not only

that barefooted children are no longer seen in the streets, or that the ideal of a gentleman has been discarded. Lord Radcliffe goes so far as to wonder if Europeans alike in Europe and overseas are not in process of cutting themselves off from the past as near to absolutely as they can. The process may go on for a long time, but he thinks that the break will not be any the less complete in the end. We are already inside a half-world of shadows, the world made for us, he says, by publicity, advertising, public relations, promotion, and popular entertainment. There is a curious indifference—he calls it "an indifferentism"—to values that sixty years ago seemed unshakable.

And if it is something of the kind that is happening to us white people, men of other colour are undergoing an equally radical transformation of their lives. Christopher Dawson calls it "the revolt of Asia (and Africa)". Western man has been an imperialist and an exploiter, and, for one thing, it is to these activities of his that the millions in Asia and Africa are calling a halt. But also—and this is a second and more important thing—"the oldest and most fundamental institutions which seemed inseparable from Asiatic civilization have lost their sacred prestige and are threatened with destruction". "The revolt of Asia" is only secondarily a revolt against the white man; first and foremost it is a scrapping of monumental and immemorial Asiatic cultures. Outside Europe and the lands of European settlement, everybody's ambition is to be a second-rate European.

Change is thus twofold—in Europe, America, and Australasia there is a general about-turn away from European tradition, a handing over to Lucky Jims, and in Asia and Africa there is the eagerness to embrace a European culture that is decaying at its roots. Has anybody been able to seize the profound and unifying significance of the twofold movement?

Romano Guardini—the German theologian whose lectures in Munich draw, I am told, attentive crowds—thinks that he himself has. This little book is an American translation of *Das Ende der Neuzeit* (1950), a compact affair in strong contrast to the large *Der Herr*, of which I reviewed here in 1956 without enthusiasm an American translation. Its three chapters were originally intended, he says, to introduce lectures on Pascal's attitude to the world and to man. In his view, not the least of Pascal's extraordinary merits was the clear perception of the direction whither the radical changes already taking place around him were bound to lead.

Whereas his teachers, Montaigne (1533–92) and Descartes (1596–1650), blithely and each in his own way went to work to shape the new age—the age of the Renaissance—with scarcely an inkling of how much of the past they were repudiating, Pascal (1623–62) was granted, according to Guardini, an acute insight into what was really afoot. To Guardini, that prescience then is particularly pertinent to-day, for he feels that since 1914 the age of the Renaissance—*die Neuzeit*—has been suffering the spasms of dissolution, and that in our lifetimes one more new age—which may even be, he suggests, *die Endzeit*—is arising. If we let the Middle Ages be personified for

us by Dante and the age ushered in by the Renaissance by Goethe, then already now the world of Goethe has become, he says, as remote as the world of Dante.

Messrs Joseph Theman and Herbert Burke's translation is unsatisfactory. A key German word occurring twice in a paragraph will be rendered first by one English word and then by another. In comparison with the author's quiet earnestness, the introduction by Frederick D. Wilhelmsen sounds strident. Nevertheless, the brilliance and challenge of the original come through; and likewise the final note of hope. The threat to the Church immanent in the coming age is not to be minimized, and Guardini does not minimize it. But he retains undaunted his faith in love.

MONTGOMERY BELGION.

PETERBOROUGH.

ANGLICANISM AND EPISCOPACY: A. RE-EXAMINATION OF EVIDENCE. By A. L. Peck. Faith Press. 16s.

An author may well feel flattered that an *opusculum* from his hand should provoke the industrious and meticulous pen of Dr Peck to a detailed examination of 74 pages, as well as providing a target for the scholastic dialectic of Dr E. L. Mascall; though he may justly echo the psalmist's prayer (according to the Prayer Book version) that, if the righteous smite him friendly and reprove him, yet let not their precious balms break his head! Within the short compass of a review, only a few points may be mentioned out of many to which the author would wish to reply.

Perhaps the reader may be advised at the outset to remark the skilful strategy of innuendo by which Dr Peck encompasses his refutation. For example, on p. 42 he affirms that, after discussing the cases of De Laune and Calandrinus, I "regretfully" comment on the paucity of such cases. *Regretfully* of course is Dr Peck's insinuation. I did not use the adverb; and only clairvoyance can have enabled him to offer this misinterpretation. Again, on p. 60 he refers to "the *tiresome* Act of Uniformity of 1662", where his arbitrary introduction of the epithet is intended to disparage his author, who of course did not employ it himself. Or again, on p. 70 he alleges that I describe schemes and negotiations for ecclesiastical reunion "as though they were to be conducted between joint-stock companies contemplating amalgamation", attempting once more to prejudice the reader by a comparison of his own devising, intended to cast odium. On p. 73 he concludes that I regard episcopacy as merely "an accident of history", and probably "an unhappy one"; not deigning to explain the incompatibility of this aspersion with my championship of the Anglican advocacy of a restoration of episcopacy to the non-episcopal churches as an indispensable condition of corporate reunion. But perhaps the *reductio ad absurdum* of this method of controversy is to be found in his statement in a footnote to p. 23, repeated on p. 73, that I compare "the apostolic ministry to a ghost

haunting the Church". Exactly the same, erroneous conclusion could be drawn in respect of Dr T. M. Parker's use of the same reference to the ghost of Hamlet's father as that cited by myself, in his essay in *The Apostolic Ministry*. Readers may be left to form their own judgment from these examples whether Dr Peck's case is strengthened or weakened by such controversial methods.

On pp. 15–17 of Volume II of my *William Wake, Archbishop of Canterbury*—a work which Dr Peck has done me the honour to mention in a footnote to p. 44 of his own book—I cited a long letter from Wake to Le Courayer summarizing the archbishop's view of the Anglican attitude towards foreign non-episcopal churches, their ministry and sacraments, and towards the *apologia* for episcopacy in his own church. In particular Wake concluded by stating that "the sum of all is: that in these particulars our divines have from the beginning gone their several ways; but yet so as not to have either given up our own episcopal succession or consecration on the one hand, or to have utterly condemned the establishment of the Reformed churches abroad on the other". I remain of opinion that the interpretation of the Anglican tradition in these respects set forth in *Old Priest and New Presbyter* is identical with that expressed by Wake. Perhaps Dr Peck would have done better service if, instead of contenting himself with shooting down an academic sparrow, he had also told his readers whether Wake in this lengthy exposition understood his authorities correctly, or whether Dr Peck alone has a sound understanding of them.

The contention which I advanced, namely that the traditional Anglican apologetic for episcopacy rested on the ground of its continuous preservation in the church since the apostolic age, is characterized by Dr Peck (on p. 14) as "an unreasoning antiquarian prejudice". I find it surprising that a writer of Dr Peck's churchmanship should describe and dismiss the Anglican appeal to the history of the primitive church and to continuity of Order since the times of the apostles, in such terms. But his particular scorn is reserved for my appeal to post-Reformation Anglican history, formularies and divines. "It is assumed that the Church of England is a self-subsisting organization, *whose history began as it were on a blank sheet somewhere about the middle of the sixteenth century*" (p. 10, *italics mine*). This of course is not even a caricature of the truth; it is a plain untruth; as anyone familiar with such books as I have published may verify for himself. Perhaps, however, upon second thoughts Dr Peck might be prepared to admit that in the sixteenth century the *Ecclesia Anglicana* by its repudiation of the papal supremacy became as a matter of historical fact an independent, national church with its own distinctive Book of Common Prayer, Ordinal and Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion; and that such not inconsiderable changes justify an appeal to these official documents for the understanding of its particular doctrine of the church and ministry. I agree with Dr Peck's criticism that the single sentence in *Old Priest and New Presbyter* referring to the influence of seventeenth-century Anglican patristic studies on its doctrine of episcopacy was inadequate; but

already, before the appearance of his book, I had devoted the greater part of one of my Ford Lectures, given at Oxford in Hilary Term 1958 to this specific issue, so that I hope in due time his wrath will be assuaged. On other points of his criticism, such as my use of the term "necessity" and its adjective "necessary", in "two quite different senses" (p. 34), I must reply that I follow the example of Hall, Bramhall and Thorndike, as is evident from Dr Peck's quotations on pp. 36 and 38. It is also true that Dr Peck dislikes very much the distinction between the "essence" and the "perfection" of the church; but for this his wrath must fall upon Whitgift, Hall and Bramhall. When he rebukes me solemnly for venturing "to suggest that the gift of the apostolic ministry is comparable in status with a tiresome and uncharitable rubric" (p. 23)—introducing, it may be observed in passing, his own favourite epithet of "tiresome"—it must be presumed that he is not aware who used the phrase "Doctor, charity is above rubrics", nor upon what occasion.

But the narrow limits of a review forbid further detailed comment; and of course the reader must be left to decide whether *Old Priest and New Presbyter* or *Anglicanism and Episcopacy* is the more accurate interpreter of the traditional Anglican view of episcopacy. Perhaps, however, it may be serviceable to clear up some of Dr Peck's own misapprehensions. My argument that the typical Anglican tradition has been that episcopacy was necessary where it could be had, meant what it said; namely, for example, that the Anglican divines adopted a different attitude towards domestic Dissenters from that which they assumed towards foreign non-episcopal churches, precisely because they judged the former not to labour under that "necessity" which they admitted in respect of churches abroad. Further, my exposition of Anglican insistence upon the restoration of episcopacy in non-episcopal churches, both abroad and at home, as an indispensable condition of reunion, is unintelligible without this presupposition that episcopacy is necessary to the fullness or perfection of the church. Again, the Anglican appeal in behalf of episcopacy to its continuity in the church since the times of the apostles is a positive, strong and persuasive *apologia*, not to be dismissed with contumely as "an unreasoning antiquarian prejudice". On the other hand, I contend that the evidence is clear and emphatic that the Anglican *via media* in respect of episcopal order and regimen does not deny the validity of the ministries and sacraments of those foreign non-episcopal churches, forced by the circumstances of past history to choose between purity of faith and maintenance of traditional order; and that the Tractarian position introduced a new emphasis on the *exclusive* validity of episcopal ministries and sacraments. With regard to the historic episcopate I am content to accept the definition offered in Sententia XI of the Latin version of the Lambeth Quadrilateral: Episcopatum ex antiquis saeculis traditum, ratione quidem administrationis gentium necessitatibus accommodatum et populorum a Deo in Ecclesiae unitate vocatorum.

CAMBRIDGE. NORMAN SYKES.

SHORTER NOTICES

COMPARATIVE LITURGY. By A. Baumstark. 3rd edition, revised by Dom B. Botte and translated by F. L. Cross. Mowbrays. 35s.

THE CHRISTIAN YEAR AND LECTIONARY REFORM. By A. A. McArthur. S.C.M. Press. 25s.

HOLY WEEK: A COMMENTARY. By Dom M. Tierney, O.S.B. Browne and Nolan. 5s.

CHRIST OUR PASSOVER: THE LITURGICAL OBSERVANCE OF HOLY WEEK. By J. T. Martin and D. M. Paton. S.C.M. Press. 8s

THE MINISTRY OF THE WORD. By R. E. C. Browne. S.C.M. Press. 8s. 6d.

HYMNS OF THE FAITH. Edited by G. W. Briggs and others. Printed for use in Worcester Cathedral.

Dr Baumstark's original aim was to show "the value of the Comparative Method as applied to the history of Liturgy", which he did by briefly surveying the whole field of liturgy. This method means that he can only give typical examples under each heading, and there is an inevitable feeling of compression and incompleteness: each chapter could well have been expanded into a book. Although Baumstark regarded his work as "propaganda" rather than "a systematic introduction to the subject", the erudition displayed is enormous. Dom Bernard Botte's footnotes, however, show, as his introduction hints, that Baumstark's theories are not to be accepted uncritically. The reader is left at times with a useful hint rather than a piece of significant information: on p. 78, for instance, he is told that part of the *Roman Litany of the Saints* "has a striking parallel in the Litany *Kârôzûthâ* of the Nestorians"; but he is not told what the parallel is, or what it shows, or where to find the Litany in question. The bibliography, containing only "the more important editions of the texts of each Rite", runs to 35 pages, and will be of the greatest value. It makes one regret all the more that Dr Baumstark refrained from compiling the "synthetic table, putting before the reader the different Rites and their reciprocal affinities, as well as their linguistic and national ramifications" to which he refers in his introduction.

Dr McArthur gives a most lucid account of the early development of lectionaries; but his chief object is to argue for a "primitive" Kalendar as the foundation of a Christian Year based on the Creed. A lectionary so based is printed in full, with a set of tables showing just how much of the Bible is read and left unread. The scheme is admirably logical and worked out with loving care; but as the details are studied, doubts begin to arise in the Anglican mind. To include the first article of the Creed the year must start before Advent, so we begin with Genesis 1 for the Harvest Festival, an excellent touch. But would we really want five weeks on the doctrine of creation? And is it wise in the ecumenical context to set up a rival church year starting at a different time? Dr McArthur inveighs against "disorderly subjectivism" in the choice of lessons, but his tables reveal

that he himself chooses to read 61 per cent of Deutero-Isaiah as against 2 per cent of Ezekiel. The "reading of the books of the Bible in course" may be "a quite unsatisfactory method" in some respects, but it does ensure a fair balance between books. Likewise, "it is always dangerous to approach the liturgical past with fixed presuppositions" (p. 38), but it is difficult not to see fixed presuppositions in the total omission of saints' days from McArthur's "primitive" kalendar, though commemorations of the martyrs began as early as A.D. 156. The fact is that the Christian Year has grown naturally from the desire to celebrate events, and not in accordance with a predetermined plan of doctrinal exposition, however useful it may be as a medium for the latter.

Both the next two books commend, describe, and expound the new Roman rite for Holy Week. Dom Mark Tierney's exposition is scriptural, doctrinal, and devotional in turn, and could hardly be better done. It should help the faithful of Ireland to accept the reform. Mr Martin prints the text of the three services as adapted for a particular Church of England parish, together with a specimen sermon for each. They are to be used in addition to the Prayer Book services, which are also sympathetically expounded, though there is a curious error on p. 37, where Psalm 60 is commented upon for Good Friday Evensong instead of Psalm 69. Mr Martin is by no means the only priest who finds the Prayer Book services sufficient, indeed overwhelming, for himself, yet is disappointed by their failure to attract or hold his people. Nor does the "old-style Holy Week" of "devotional titbits" commend itself. Something along the Roman lines seems to be needed, especially on Easter Eve. In the last chapter, Mr Martin's former vicar outlines an answer to the question "By what authority doest thou these things?"

Mr Browne has written a disturbing, humbling book. Like Bishop Ridding's Litany, it hits the preacher in one weak spot after another (it is really about the minister, rather than the ministry, of the word). Yet it is also full of suggestion and encouragement. The preacher has so much to learn from the poet, so much to learn about himself, so much to unlearn about preaching. If only his people could read this book too! Few could or will; as Mr Browne hints, we need a companion study on the ministry of hearing (p. 68). Meanwhile, this is required reading for all preachers, though not always easy reading (paradox can be overdone). Beginners should treat it with caution; such advice as "talk ambiguously with unswerving confidence" needs experience to be fully understood.

Hymns of the Faith, the new Worcester Cathedral hymnal, is by *Hymns A. and M. Revised* out of *Songs of Praise*, plus a more generous admixture of Wesley, Watts, and the compilers' own hymns. The classification by seasons and subjects is worked out in more than usual detail, and there is an excellent preface by the editor. Unusual features include a section headed "Science", and twenty-two well-known carols. It is not generally on sale, which is a pity.

Billesdon, Leicester. Geoffrey Cuming.

A Profest Papist: Bishop John Gordon. By T. F. Taylor. S.P.C.K. (for C.H.S.). 7s. 6d.

During his life Bishop John Gordon was an unpleasant, and not very considerable, figure. His sole claim to historical memorial lies in the fact that, when he became a Roman Catholic in 1703–4, Rome declared his Orders to be null and void, and administered to him anew the rite of Confirmation and ordained him to the minor orders. This precedent played an important part in the papal condemnation of Anglican ordinations in 1896. It was assumed then that he had been consecrated—for his priestly ordination remains obscure—according to the Ordinal of 1662.

The "blurb" on Fr Taylor's booklet states that "he has been able to demonstrate conclusively that, by whatever rite Gordon was ordained, it was not that of 1662". In his text Fr Taylor makes no such claim. What he has done is to show that it is highly improbable that the 1662 rite was used. He shows, incidentally, that the account which Gordon himself gave to the Roman authorities of his consecration was such that any part of the Catholic Church would certainly pronounce it invalid. He also shows that Gordon was a liar, and had an axe to grind at this point.

The booklet is a fascinating essay, stemming from an unpublished paper of Dom Gregory Dix, in the best tradition of historical scholarship. I wish it had appeared in a learned review, rather than as a separate (and expensive) pamphlet, to ensure its wider circulation.

H. R. T. Brandreth, O.G.S.

Paris.

Felix's Life of St Guthlac. Edited with translation, introduction and notes by Bertram Colgrave. Cambridge University Press. 30s.

During the war, while priest in charge at Crowland, I lent a copy of Birch's edition of this eighth-century text to the late Dr Dix of Nashdom Abbey. That is a measure of the difficulty that there has been in consulting this biography. Dix had published an exciting little work on aumbries, and was interested in the statement that the dying Guthlac stretched out his hand and took viaticum from the altar in his oratory, reserved there since the Easter Mass a few days before. He was not certain that the text had not been touched up a century or so after its composition. Now all who will can read the contemporary life of this classical Saxon hermit, the fenland Anthony. Mr Colgrave has already blessed us with sound editions of Eddius's Life of Wilfrid and the Two Lives of St Cuthbert. His work on this third is well done and well worth doing. He has used twelve MSS and a fragment, and lists seven MSS no longer extant. One suspects if space had allowed he could have particularized his interesting dicta on the latinity. His notes fruit from a deep and exact scholarship, and if sometimes tantalizing, that is because he stops where facts verge on fancies. Only those drunk with the will to believe seek for history in the famous forged chronicles of the medieval abbey at

Crowland. Mr Colgrave is incisive about the tradition of the founding of the abbey a few years after Guthlac's death. There is, he says, little or no evidence for any monastery at Crowland before the mid-tenth century. Lovers of the fenlands, lovers of Saxon Christendom, will be greatly grateful for the labours that have put this book into our hands.

LEICESTER. ROBERT SYMONDS.

ST BERNARD, THE STEPS OF HUMILITY. Translated by Geoffrey Webb and Adrian Walker. Mowbray (Fleur-de-lis Series). 6s.

Being unable to refer to St Bernard's Latin, I must assume that this is a reliable translation of his words: it is certainly readable. But I wonder whether what is needed is a translation not of his words but of his ideas. Even though pride and humility are essentially the same now as in St Bernard's days, our intellectual environment is very different. Many readers will be offended by the highly artificial scheme of this book (it is based on the twelve degrees of humility in St Benedict's Rule) and by the extraordinary exegesis of many passages of scripture; but with patience readers will find some useful ideas, and will appreciate St Bernard's keen insight into human nature.

MADAGASCAR. ALAN ROGERS.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: Wayne E. Oates, *Anxiety in Christian Experience* (15s.).

A. AND C. BLACK: Sheldon H. Blank, *Prophetic Faith in Isaiah* (18s.); A. R. C. Leaney, *The Gospel according to St Luke* (25s.).

JAMES CLARKE AND CO.: Edward J. Young, *The Study of Old Testament Theology To-day* (10s. 6d.).

EDINBURGH HOUSE PRESS: J. E. Fison, *Fire upon the Earth* (5s.).

EPWORTH PRESS: T. E. Jessop, *On Reading the English Bible* (5s.); J. Alan Kay (Ed.), *Wesley's Prayers and Praises* (15s.); Eric Baker, *The Faith of a Methodist* (8s. 6d.); T. W. Manson, *Ministry and Priesthood: Christ's and Ours* (6s. 6d.).

FALCON'S WING PRESS (COLORADO): H. H. Rowley (Ed.), *Eleven Years of Bible Bibliography* ($7.50).

LONGMANS: J. Van der Ploeg, *The Excavations at Qumran* (16s. 6d.); M. F. Toal (Ed.), *The Sunday Sermons of the Great Fathers*, Vol. I (16s. 6d.).

LUTTERWORTH PRESS: J. G. Davies, *He Ascended into Heaven* (35s.).

NISBET: F. R. Barry, *Vocation and Ministry* (12s. 6d.).

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (O.U.P.): Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies* (80s.).

S.C.M. PRESS: Saint Teresa, *The Interior Castle or the Mansions* (9s. 6d.); André Parrot, *Babylon and the Old Testament* (10s. 6d.); André Parrot, *Samaria: The Capital of the Kingdom of Israel* (10s. 6d.); *Thinking Things Through*, Nos 1–6 [a series of discussion books for young people] (2s. 6d. each).

S.P.C.K.: Basil F. L. Clarke, *Anglican Cathedrals outside the British Isles* (45s.); G. F. S. Gray, *The Anglican Communion* (12s. 6d.); Oscar Hardman, *"But I am a Catholic!"* (5s. 6d.).

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